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STALLED ON THE ROAD TO HEALTH CARE
REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL
IMPEDIMENTS TO THE OREGON
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
We are engaged in a great struggle to reform the American
health care system, a system addicted to increasing costs and de-
creasing equity. The first tactic of someone suffering from ad-
dictive behavior is two-fold: to try to remove the bad habit with
the least possible disruption to the ordinary way of life, and to
try to change the undesirable behavior in a painless, incremental
way. This tactic rarely works, as any reformed smoker or alco-
holic can testify. The price of real change is harsher self-exami-
nation and the revision of basic values and habits.1
In his article explicating the merit and necessity of health care ration-
ing,2 philosopher Daniel Callahan argues that the time has come for the
American health care system to engage in harsh self-examination, and to
move forward toward true reform. 3 In Callahan's view, the problem un-
derlying the American addiction to health care is the extraordinary
amount of money spent without receiving commensurate value for the
investment or increased equity in terms of access to care.4
Equity, efficiency, and consensus on health care priorities are the three
elements that must be combined in order to attain "an economically
sound health care system." 5 The difficulty in achieving meaningful re-
1. Daniel Callahan, Rationing Medical Progress - The Way to Affordable Health Care,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1810, 1810-11 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Daniel Callahan, Symbols, Rationality, and Justice: Rationing Health
Care, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1992); see also Richard D. Lamm, Rationing of Health Care:
Inevitable and Desirable, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 (1992); Paul T. Menzel, Some Ethical
Costs of Rationing, LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, Spring-Summer 1992, at 57; Harry
Schwartz, We Need to Ration Medicine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 1982, at 13.
3. Callahan, supra note 1, at 1811.
4. Id.
5. Id. Equity is understood as "access for all to a base level of health care." Effi-
ciency is understood as "a means of limiting the use of procedures that are ineffective or
marginally effective as well as some of the procedures that are effective but too expensive."
Lastly, consensus on health care priorities encompasses both individual and social priori-
ties. Id.
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form6 stems from the deeply ingrained values that characterize the pres-
ent system: autonomy and freedom of choice, the idea of limitless
medical progress, and the quest for increasing levels of quality in health
care.7 Both an effective "cost-containment movement and a shift in fun-
damental values" are needed to solve the American health care crisis.'
The State of Oregon attempted such a shift in values and cost-contain-
ment strategies. Faced with 400,000 citizens who did not have health in-
surance and lack of significant corrective action at the federal level,9
Oregon enacted a comprehensive legislative package designed to ensure
that all of its residents had access to health care. 10 With a shift in empha-
sis "from who is covered to what is covered,"" the Oregon experiment
brought an array of issues to the forefront of the health care debate.
These issues range from questions of social equity to medical ethics to
states' rights.' 2
6. Presumably, meaningful reform entails the incorporation of Callahan's three ele-
ments, into the health care system.
7. Callahan, supra note 1, at 1811. Elsewhere, Callahan refers to the idea of limitless
medical progress as the "moral logic of medical progress." Daniel Callahan, Transforming
Mortality: Technology and the Allocation of Resources, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 207 (1991).
Callahan identifies three historical steps which have transformed our basic thinking: (1)
"the transformation of medicine from a caring but therapeutically ineffective calling to a
scientific discipline centered on cure;" (2) "the transformation of the idea and scope of
'health;"' and (3) the transformation of "our images and visions of what it means to live a
life." Id. at 205-06. Embedded in these historical changes is the "moral logic" of medical
progress: "what can be known, ought to be known, and what can be done, morally ought
to be done." Id. at 207. In other words, medical progress, "in the initial sense of scientific
possibility, becomes a moral imperative." Id.
8. Callahan, supra note 1, at 1812.
9. See Mark Moran, Oregon Plan Forces Hard Choices, But Praised for Fairness, MH
Coverage, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, May 3, 1991, at 15; see also Marian Freedman, Stating the
Case for Health Care Reform, BEST'S REV., April 1992, at 36, 37 (noting that in the absence
of progress at the federal level "[v]irtually every state either has taken action on the prob-
lem or is considering legislation"); Daniel S. Greenberg, State Action on Health Care Re-
form, 339 LANCET 1101 (1992) (noting that "[w]ith Washington immobilised on the subject,
several state governments are attempting their own solutions to the problems of access and
cost control in health care services"); John E. McDonough, States First: The Other Path to
National Health Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1992, at 61 (noting that states play a criti-
cal role in health care reform); Richard Sorian, Stepping Up to Bat: States Take the Lead
on Health Policy, J. AM. HEALTH POL'Y, May/June 1992, at 14a (noting that while the
federal government is "paralyzed" by election year politics and congressional corruption,
the states bear the burden of health care reform).
10. See Julie Kosterlitz, Oregon Wants a Little Medicaid Slack, 12 NAT'L J. 2766 (1989).
11. John Kitzhaber, Presentation to the Conference on Health Care: The Oregon So-
lution 1, 6 (Aug. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Kitzhaber Presentation] (transcript on file with the
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy).
12. Kosterlitz, supra note 10, at 2766.
Oregon Demonstration Project
On August 3, 1992, Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis W.
Sullivan denied the federal waiver necessary for full implementation of
the Oregon Demonstration Project.13 Citing potential legal conflicts with
the Americans With Disabilities Act, Sullivan denied final approval and
urged Oregon to submit a revised application addressing the legal con-
cerns. 4 Oregon thereafter continued its dialogue with the Health Care
Financing Administration, 5 and revised the Demonstration Project.
While the revised project has now been approved by the Clinton Admin-
istration, this Comment examines the initial proposal and its rejection.
Putting aside questions of whether to ration,' 6 this Comment focuses on
the Oregon experience as a means of exploring how to ration health care.
Part I lays out the Oregon plan in detail, exploring the social and political
context from which the plan originated, the Medicaid system in Oregon,
and the nuts and bolts of the Oregon Basic Health Services Act. Part II
discusses the reasoning behind the denial of the federal waiver, paying
particular attention to the Office of Technology Assessment's legal re-
view of the Oregon project. Part III responds to and comments on the
waiver denial. This Comment provides an in-depth examination and cri-
tique of one process utilized to ration health care at the state level.
13. Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services, to the Honorable Barbara Roberts, Governor of Oregon
(Aug. 3, 1992) [hereinafter Sullivan Letter] (on file with the Journal of Contemporary
Health Law & Policy).
14. Id.
15. See Minutes of a Meeting of the Subcomm. on the Blind and Disabled, Oregon
Health Services Commission (Aug. 26, 1992) [hereinafter Subcommittee Minutes] (on file
with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy); Minutes of a Meeting of the
Oregon Health Services Commission (Aug. 26, 1992) [hereinafter Commission Minutes]
(on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy); Letter from Paige R.
Sipes-Metzler, DPA, Executive Director of Oregon Health Services Commission, to Darrel
J. Grinstead, Chief Counsel of the Health Care Financing Administration (Sept. 10, 1992)
(on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy); Letter from Darrel J.
Grinstead, Chief Counsel of the Health Care Financing Authority, to Paige R. Sipes-Metz-
ler, DPA, Executive Director of Oregon Health Services Commission (Sept. 22, 1992) (on
file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy).
16. The author notes that there are many compelling arguments against rationing as
an acceptable or necessary means of responding to the health care crisis. See, e.g., Joseph
A. Califano, Jr., Rationing Health Care: The Unnecessary Solution, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1525 (1992); Arnold S. Relman, The Trouble With Rationing, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 911
(1990).
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I. THE OREGON DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
A. Context of the Oregon Plan
Medicaid, the largest government program for financing health care for
the nation's poor, is jointly funded by state and federal governments.' 7
Due to rising enrollment and soaring costs, the Medicaid program has
increased dramatically. 8 Enrollment in Medicaid was projected to reach
30.1 million people in 1992.'9 Health care expenditures were expected to
rise from $92.1 billion in fiscal year 1991, to $127.2 billion in fiscal year
1992.20 Trends in rising enrollment and soaring costs show no sign of
abating,2 ' thereby increasing the strain on federal and state budgets.22
Debate over rationing health care as a means of handling increased
fiscal strain began in Oregon in 1987 when the legislature decided to end
Medicaid coverage for organ transplants.23 The amount of funds previ-
ously intended for the transplants would provide basic health and prena-
tal services for 1500 pregnant women.24 The state legislature reasoned
that there were more effective ways to allocate scarce public resources
than funding costly procedures for a few people, and that more lives
could be saved per dollar by a shift in funding.25 However, the case of
Coby Howard, a seven-year old leukemia patient who died in 1988 be-
17. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OREGON'S MANAGED CARE PROGRAM AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPANSION 2 (1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
18. Id.
19. Id. at 12. This rise in enrollment represents an increase of almost 28% between
fiscal years 1989 and 1992, from 23.5 million clients to 30.1 million. Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 12. This is an increase of more than 38%. Id.
21. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17 at 14 (noting that the number of Medicaid clients
and the costs of care are expected to continue rising in future years due to economic,
social, and demographic trends, "coupled with already mandated program expansions").
22. Id. at 2. Estimated expenditures for the fiscal year 1993 total $148 billion. Id. at
14. The report further notes that state governments view Medicaid as "a substantial finan-
cial burden." In fiscal year 1991, Medicaid constituted 13.6% of all state expenditures,
second only to elementary and secondary education; state expenditures increased an aver-
age of 10% per fiscal year between 1984 and 1989, while revenues increased at a rate of
only 8%; and increased funding for Medicaid strains funding of other social services, par-
ticularly in states requiring balanced budgets. Id. When Medicaid was introduced in 1965,
funding for the program constituted only 5% of state budgets, as compared with the 15% it
is expected to command in 1995. Eric L. Robinson, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act:
A Model for State Reform?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 977, 988 (1992).
23. Julie Rovner, Oregon Plan Sparks Emotional Debate Over Rationing Health Care,
49 CONG. Q. 1278 (1991). Such medical services are considered "optional" under federal
law. Id.
24. Robinson, supra note 22, at 988-89.
25. Id.
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cause he was unable to afford a bone marrow transplant,26 prompted a
reexamination of Oregon's entire health care delivery system.27
In 1988, the governor of Oregon appointed a special task force to eval-
uate the state's health care problem. 28 The Governor's Commission on
Uncompensated Care recommended that Oregon provide equitable ac-
cess to health care to all citizens without imposing excessive financial bur-
dens on the state, the taxpayers, or the medical community.29 The
Commission identified three main impediments to access to health care:
"financial barriers to those unable to afford care," "limitations to Medi-
caid imposed by the state legislature," and "problems of availability of
26. See Harvey D. Klevit et al., Prioritization of Health Care Services: A Progress
Report by the Oregon Health Services Commission, 151 ARCHIVES INTERN. MED. 912
(1991); Robinson, supra note 25, at 989; Rovner, supra note 23, at 1278. Oregon no
longer funded most organ transplants through its Medicaid plan. Klevit, supra, at 912. At
the time of his death, Coby and his family had raised $70,000 of the $100,000 needed for
the surgery through private contributions. Robinson, supra note 22, at 989. Coby's plight
generated much publicity throughout the nation, and much discussion of the Oregon pol-
icy. Id. Opposition to the policy was so extreme that John A. Kitzhaber, Oregon Senate
President, was labeled "Dr. Death" by his critics when he wanted to "maintain the no-
transplant policy." Rovner, supra note 23, at 1278.
27. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 989. During debate over whether to overturn the
no-transplant policy, Kitzhaber realized that "we had no framework for making the deci-
sion," prompting the chain of events leading up to the Oregon Basic Health Services Act.
Rovner, supra note 23, at 1278. Kitzhaber further noted that the question of whether or-
gan transplants have merit was not the primary issue, but that
[r]ather, the question was simply this: If the state was going to invest money in its
health care budget, where should the next dollar go? What was the policy that
would lead us to fund transplants as opposed to further expanding the availability
of prenatal care? What was the policy that would lead us to offer transplants to
eight individuals as opposed to nine - or to 19? Where was the equity in giving
sophisticated and costly services to a few Oregonians covered under Medicaid
before providing basic health care services to other equally needy citizens, includ-
ing many of the "working poor," who lacked any public or private coverage?
What became readily apparent was that Oregon had no health care policy.
John Kitzhaber, A Healthier Approach to Health Care, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 1990-
91, at 59, 59-60.
28. See Richard Allen, Caring for the Uninsured: The Oregon Experience, 115
ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 437 (1991).
29. Id. at 437-38. Some 400,000 Oregonians under the age of 65 do not have health
insurance coverage. Id. at 437. Sixty-five percent of that total were employed workers and
their families. The remaining one third were either unemployed, or earning more than
58% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), which is the cut-off point in Oregon for Medicaid
qualification. An additional 15,000 uninsured individuals were considered high risks, and
consequently uninsurable. Furthermore, providers were shifting costs to the insured in
order to provide care for the uninsured. This created an expanding group of uninsured
persons, since employers who provided health care for their employees became increas-
ingly unwilling to bear this financial burden. Id.
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services, mainly in rural areas."3 The Commission further noted that
due to barriers to access, the uninsured generally received "more expen-
sive, acute, and episodic care that resulted in the shifting of cost to the
insured and in higher healthcare costs.,
31
The Commission recommended as a starting point that Oregon adopt a
mission statement recognizing "an obligation to ensure equitable access
without excessive burdens to an adequate level of health care for all
Oregonians."32 The Commission also recommended six specific steps to:
solve the problem of equitable access without excessive financial
burden: (1) an employee tax credit for small businesses; (2) a
state-run high-risk pool; (3) an expansion of Medicaid to 100
[%] of the FPL [federal poverty line]; (4) a plan for continua-
tion of benefits to the recently unemployed; (5) increased fund-
ing for primary clinics, especially in the more rural areas of the
state; and (6) various cost-containment strategies, particularly
managed care programs and tort reform.33
The Commission concluded that ensuring access to better health care
would result in cost reduction and a healthier population.34
B. Oregon's Current System
Oregon's current Medicaid program began in 1985 and utilizes a man-
aged care approach.35 As of April 1992, approximately 73,000 people in
eleven counties were enrolled in managed care plans under Oregon's
Medicaid program.36 The current program is the result of a patchwork of
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. "This obligation should be balanced by people's obligation to provide for their
own needs." Id. at 438.
33. Id. at 439.
34. Id.
35. GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 2. Under managed care, health plans such as
health maintenance organizations (HMO's) provide health services to enrolled clients for a
fixed monthly fee. Because it encourages health plans to control service use and to deliver
cost effective service, many view managed care as a hopeful approach to containing medi-
cal costs while providing access to care. The report notes, however, that safeguards are
necessary to ensure that health plans do not limit patient services inappropriately or pro-
vide substandard services in an effort to save money. Id.
36. Id. GAO noted that Oregon's managed care plan has avoided many of the
problems faced by other states: Oregon's plan is well accepted by providers and clients,
has many safeguards to "prevent inappropriate restriction in access to health care," and
has quality assurance monitoring in place which meets federal requirements. Id. at 3.
While generally sound, the Oregon program could be improved in terms of child health
screening services, client satisfaction surveys, and intensification of oversight. Id.
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state and federal laws defining who is eligible and the extent of their
eligibility.
37
Approximately 200,000 people are eligible for the Medicaid program in
Oregon.3 1 More than twice that number, however, have no health insur-
ance at all.3 9 An estimated 120,000 uninsureds with incomes below the
Federal Poverty Line (FPL) do not qualify for Medicaid because their
income is nonetheless too high or their family status excludes them from
the program. 4 In 1990, the program cost $230 million, of which sixty-
37. David M. Eddy, What's Going on in Oregon?, 266 JAMA 417, 418 (1991). Eddy
recognized six main building blocks to determine eligibility: "the presence of children in a
family, the ages of the children, whether a woman is pregnant, whether someone is aged,
the presence of a major disability, and income." Id. Federal law. defines the groups for
whom coverage is mandatory, optional, and forbidden based on varying combinations of
these six categories. Id. Once eligibility is determined, one qualifies for generous coverage
due to the fact that federally mandated services are defined by broad categories, with few
restrictions within these categories. Id. States have few choices in the face of increasing
costs of Medicaid programs: they can raise taxes, but this is often blocked by public per-
ception that taxes are already too high; they can reduce payments to providers, but this
simply shifts the costs to others or prompts providers to refuse to treat Medicaid patients;
they can pull money from other social programs in the state budget, but this not only
deprives recipients of those programs, but also has a negative, indirect effect on health; or
lastly, they can tighten or limit criteria for coverage by lowering the threshold that qualifies
a family for coverage, by dropping optional groups, or by dropping optional categories of
services. Id. at 419. States most frequently choose the last option. Id. The net effect of
the legislative patchwork is "a program that covers virtually every medical service for a
subset of poor people but covers nothing for a far larger number of people who are poor or
nearly poor." Id. at 418. The results can be extreme, as in Alabama where the income
threshold for Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) is set at 14% of FPL. Id.
at 419.
38. Id. at 418.
39. Id. The statistic cited in this article is 450,000, or 18% of the state's population. Id.
Based on a 1986 survey by the State Health Planning and Development Agency (presently
the Office of Health Policy), it is estimated that 16% of households where the head is
under 65 years of age are uninsured; uninsured heads of households and their spouses are
less likely to see a doctor; uninsureds who do see a doctor make more visits to the doctor
than insureds; average out-of-pocket expenditures for hospitalization are higher among the
uninsured; the uninsured tend to be younger, single, less educated, of lower financial sta-
tus, and unemployed or only marginally employed; uninsured persons are less likely to
have a regular source of care, and more likely to delay needed care because of cost; the
uninsured are more likely to report disabling medical conditions, and to experience days
away from work because of illness. OREGON HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSION, PRIORITIZA-
TION OF HEALTH SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE, at xviii
(1991) [hereinafter HSC REPORT] (on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law &
Policy).
40. Eddy, supra note 37, at 418. By "not poor enough," Eddy means that these unin-
sured persons have incomes above 50% of the FPL. In terms of "right family status,"
Eddy indicates that these persons have no children, are not pregnant, or the children are
too old. Eddy notes that "[a] family of four with an income of $541 a month is 'too rich' to
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three percent was covered by the federal government and thirty-seven
percent by the state.41 Under current laws, costs continue to grow with-
out control.42 In the face of increasing fiscal pressures and limitations,
Oregon "covertly" rationed health care in its system by "decreasing the
number of individuals eligible for Medicaid services.",
43
C. The Oregon Basic Health Services Act
1. Overview of Purpose and Goals
The Oregon Basic Health Services Act (OBHSA) was envisioned as a
means of addressing the lack of a cohesive and comprehensive health
care policy."4 OBSHA was prompted by a desire to create a new system
that recognized the reality of fiscal limitations, carefully defined public
policy objectives, and established a sense of accountability for resource
allocation decisions. 45 Dr. John Kitzhaber, an emergency physician and
former President of the Oregon Senate, characterized the effort as a sys-
temic approach to the health care problems of Oregon that addresses the
problems identified by the 1988 Governor's Commission on Uncompen-
sated Care.46
A clear policy objective that evolved was "to keep all Oregonians
healthy," as opposed to simply providing them with access to health
qualify, even though private insurance would cost them about $204 a month." Id. Pres-
ently, a person must fall into a federally specified need category and have income much
lower than the FPL in order to qualify for Medicaid in Oregon. OFFICE oF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, SUMMARY: EVALUATION OF THE OREGON MEDICAID PROPOSAL 1 (1992)
[hereinafter OTA SUMMARY]. For example, Oregon residents who receive AFDC assist-
ance must have incomes of less than 50% of FPL. Id. FPL was defined in 1992 as an
annual income of $11,570 for a family of three. Id. at 1 n.1.
41. Eddy, supra note 37, at 418.
42. Id. Part of the increasing costs is tied to the inflation of medical care in both the
public and private sectors. The remainder is tied to new requirements at the federal level
mandating additional services for eligible recipients. Id.
43. Klevit et al., supra note 26, at 912. Kitzhaber argues that there are actually three
ways in which the present system arbitrarily rations health care: by adjusting Medicaid
income levels to disqualify certain individuals; by age; and by inappropriate and ineffective
application of resources. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT: OREGON
PLAN SPARKS DEBATE 172 (1990) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT]. As an example of this
last means of rationing, Kitzhaber points to the fact that nearly one half of the Medicaid
budget is spent on care for people during their last 30 days of life. Id.
44. Kitzhaber, supra note 27, at 60.
45. Id.
46. Kitzhaber Presentation, supra note 11, at 13. The initial intent was to address the
twin problems of access and cost, in a manner that encompassed public and private compo-
nents. Id. at 1.
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care.47 Underlying this distinction is the realization that "health care is
not necessarily synonymous with health. '48 Health care is important only
if it furthers the goal of maintaining, restoring, or improving health.
49
Other social problems, such as housing, education and environmental fac-
tors, affect health as well.5" Therefore, in order to promote health as a
policy objective, Oregon realized that it must reform its health care sys-
tem in a comprehensive manner. 51 Putting greater resources into increas-
ing access to health care at the expense of other important social
programs would not advance the overall goal of health. 2 Stated more
succinctly, "[tlhe Oregon proposal represents an effort to develop not
simply a health care policy, but a health policy: an integrated approach in
which resource allocations for health care are balanced with allocations in
related areas which also affect health.,
53
In terms of the need for accountability in the decision making process,
Kitzhaber notes that the current system "allows us to make these alloca-
tion decisions in a vacuum - responding to the emotionalism of a highly
visible individual in need, while ignoring thousands of others equally in
need ... simply because they are not highly visible."54 OBHSA recog-
nizes that an explicit decision to allocate money for one set of medical
services necessarily entails an implicit decision not to allocate money for
another set of services. 55  OBHSA requires that policymakers make
health care allocation decisions explicitly, weighing the overall social
costs and benefits and assuming accountability for these decisions and
their consequences. 6
2. Ethical Foundations
In his article analyzing the Oregon plan, Michael Garland identified
three central ethical commitments that serve as guiding principles for
OBHSA.5 7 The first commitment is to the idea that "it is more equitable
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 5-6.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. Such implicit decisions, in essence, constitute rationing of health care with no
real means of accountability. Kitzhaber, supra note 27, at 61.
56. Kitzhaber Presentation, supra note 11, at 5.
57. Michael J. Garland, Justice, Politics and Community: Expanding Access and Ra-
1994]
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to assure everyone basic health care than to offer a larger but unevalu-
ated collection of benefits to some of the poor while excluding others
from anything but emergency care.",58 The second is that "explicit, pub-
licly accountable choice is better than the hidden rationing that now oc-
curs."5 9 The third commitment is that "health care priorities should
combine authentic values of the community with expert technical judg-
ments about health services."'
Additional underlying principles of the Oregon plan have been identi-
fied. The state's citizens must have universal access to a basic level of
care, and a process must be established for determining this basic level.61
The criteria used in the process must be publicly debated, reflect' societal
values, and consider the common good.62 Society must provide resources
for those who cannot finance an acceptable level of care.6 3 The health
care distribution system must provide effective and appropriate treat-
ments, rather than those with marginal or unproven benefit." Lastly, al-
locations for health care must be part of a broader policy that
encompasses other social programs that affect health.65
3. The Legislation
In 1989, the Oregon legislature adopted "sweeping initiatives" to in-
crease access to health care." The OBHSA consists of three complimen-
tary bills, each targeting a specific segment of the uninsured population.
67
First, Senate Bill 534 establishes a high risk, state subsidized insurance
pool for the uninsurable and the chronically ill.' Second, Senate Bill 935
targets persons who are employed but have no employer-based health
tioning Health Services in Oregon, LAW, MED. & HEALTHCARE, Spring-Summer 1992, at
67, 68.
58. Id. Many criticisms of the Oregon plan are aimed at this premise. Callahan
phrases the question as: "Do you cut back on people, or do you cut back on services? ...
It's at least a moral toss-up." Moran, supra note 9, at 15.
59. Garland, supra note 57, at 68.
60. Id.
61. Judith P. Rooks, Let's Admit We Ration Health Care - Then Set Priorities, AM. J.





66. Klevit et al., supra note 26, at 912.
67. Id.; see also OTA SUMMARY, supra note 40, at 2, Box A. The three bills are S. 534,
S. 935, and S. 27, and are codified at OR. REv. STAT. §§ 414.705-.750 (1990).
68. HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at xvii.
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insurance. 9 This bill mandates that employers provide health insurance
to their employees and dependents.7' The minimum benefit package of-
fered by employers under S. 935 must match that provided for the Medi-
caid population.7' Employers who fail to provide insurance to their
employees after 1994 are required to make mandatory contributions to a
state fund from which uninsured employees may purchase insurance.72
Senate Bill 27, which establishes the Oregon Medicaid Demonstration
Project, is the third and most controversial part of OBHSA.73
4. Senate Bill 27 - The Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project
Under S. 27, income is the sole test for Medicaid eligibility.74 This shift
in eligibility criterion increases Medicaid coverage to 100% of the FPL.75
S. 27 also dramatically alters the way in which benefits are defined, and
expands the use of managed care.76 S. 27 "mandates a prioritized health
service list,"' 77 which is the key innovation of the project.7" Cutting serv-
ices rather than people in the face of fiscal constraints is a "sharp depar-
ture" from existing federal law.79
Under S. 27, the governor appointed an eleven member body to serve




73. Klevi*t et al., supra note 26, at 912.
74. HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at xvii.
75. Klevit et al., supra note 26, at 912.
76. OTA SUMMARY, supra note 40, at 2, Box A.
77. HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at xvii.
78. Garland, supra note 57, at 67. Prioritization encompasses the notion that "from a
societal perspective, some health services can be declared more important than others."
Id. Further, the whole range of services can be arranged to reflect the priorities of a given
society. Id. Although novel, prioritization is not without precedent. McDERMOTt, WILL
& EMERY [ON BEHALF OF THE DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF OREGON],
ISSUE BRIEF: DOES THE PROPOSED OREGON HEALTH PLAN DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
VIOLATE THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT? 1 (July 1, 1992) [hereinafter ISSUE
BRIEF] (on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy). In the face of
budget constraints, most states have set priorities concerning which of the optional Medi-
caid services would be funded. Oregon's novelty is in ranking and prioritizing all health
services covered by Medicaid, including services ordinarily considered "mandatory serv-
ices" under federal law. Id
79. Kosterlitz, supra note 10, at 2766. "lkaditionally, federal law requires that states
offer "all necessary medical services" to Medicaid patients. With appropriate waivers of
federal law, Oregon would instead exercise the right to choose which medical procedures
patients can receive. Id.
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as the Oregon Health Services Commission (HSC).8° The legislature as-
signed to the HSC the task of reporting "a list of health services ranked
by priority from the most important to the least important, representing
the comparative benefits of each service to the entire population to be
served.""1 With this general mission and no established procedures for
carrying it out,8 2 the HSC divided "tasks and responsibilities among the
general public, the commission, the legislature, and specific agencies."8"
The methodology employed by the HSC was "a four step process for
health resource allocation."'  In the first step, the HSC was required to
develop a prioritized list of all health services covered by Medicaid. 5
80. Klevit et al., supra note 26, at 912. The HSC was composed of five physicians, one
public health nurse, one social worker, and four laypersons. Id. at 913.
81. Id. at 912. Additional fundamental provisions include:
(1) active solicitation of public involvement in a meeting process to build a con-
sensus on the values to be used to guide health resource allocation decisions; (2)
implementation through contracting with managed-care systems; (3) the legisla-
ture, at a time of budgetary shortfall, would ...be obliged to decrease the
number of available services or make more funds available to cover the existing
services; (4) the reimbursement or capitation rates for providers and plans...
could not be reduced at a time of insufficient resources ....
Id.
82.. HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 4.
83. Garland, supra note 57, at 68. The division of responsibilities was a critical ele-
ment of the plan, and allowed for a "separation of value considerations from technical
facts" during initial phases of the prioritization. The division further allowed development
of the priority list unimpeded by political pressures commonly felt in the legislature. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. This first step can be broken down into three stages. The first stage entailed
the categorizing and ranking of condition/treatment pairs. The HSC assembled a list of 709
condition/treatment pairs. These pairs were then organized into 17 general categories that
were created and ranked by HSC. See IssuE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 1; OTA SUMMARY,
supra note 40, at 4. "Essential services" include: acute fatal where treatment prevents
death with full recovery; maternity care including most disorders of newborns and obstetri-
cal care for pregnancy; acute fatal where treatment prevents death without full recovery;
preventive care for children; chronic fatal where treatment improves life span and quality
of life; reproductive services; comfort care which includes palliative therapy for conditions
where death is imminent; preventive dental care for adults and children; and proven effec-
tive preventive care for adults. OTA SUMMARY, supra note 40, at 6; HSC REPORT, supra
note 39, at 18-19. "Very important services" include: acute nonfatal where treatment
causes a return to previous health state; chronic nonfatal where one-time treatment im-
proves quality of life; acute nonfatal where treatment does not return to previous health
state; and chronic nonfatal where repetitive treatment improves quality of life. OTA SuM-
MARY, supra note 40, at 6; HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 19. Services that are "valuable
to certain individuals" include: acute nonfatal where treatment expedites recovery of a
self-limiting condition; infertility services; less effective preventive care for adults; and fatal
or nonfatal where treatment causes minimal or no improvement in quality of life. Id. The
ranking of these categories by the HSC was the primary factor in how the condition/treat-
ment pairs ultimately were ranked in the priority setting process. For each condition/treat-
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This list was based on community values about health care and technical
information about the effectiveness of health services. a6 The second step
commenced upon completion and delivery of the list to the legislature. 7
In this step, the legislature set the budget, which de facto established the
benefit package for the new Oregon Medicaid Program."8 Activity in the
third step was twofold: the Office of Medical Assistance Programs
(OMAP) requested the necessary waivers of federal Medicaid regula-
tions, and the agencies established the administrative and evaluative ele-
ments necessary to run the complex social program. 9 The fourth step
ment pair, the HSC gathered information concerning "(1) the expected probability of
successful treatment of the condition; (2) the duration of treatment benefits; and (3) the
costs of treatment." ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 1-2.
The second stage consisted of the actual ranking of the condition/treatment pairs. Id. at
2. This, in turn, entailed three concurrent processes. First, the HSC prepared a net benefit
comparison for each pair. Based on medical literature and clinician input, the HSC deter-
mined the extent to which treatment results in an improved condition, as compared to
expected condition without treatment. Condition/treatment pairs were quantified by
whether the outcome, with or without treatment, resulted in death, a return to prior condi-
tion, or other symptoms or functional impairments. Second, the HSC solicited public opin-
ion on the importance of health states and medical conditions covered by the condition/
treatment pairs. Id. After 47 community meetings conducted by Oregon Health Deci-
sions, a consensus of 13 health-related values emerged. HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 21.
These were grouped by the HSC into three attributes: value to society, value to an individ-
ual at risk of needing the service, and essential to basic health care. Id. at 21-22. Various
social advocates gave testimony at a series of 12 public hearings, which proved useful for
understanding the general tone of public needs and concerns. Id. at 22. In addition, a
telephone survey gauged public reaction to the symptoms and functional impairments of
specific health states. IssuE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 2. Third, a preliminary ranking was
undertaken, utilizing net-benefit comparisons and social value input. Id. at 4.
The third stage consisted of a line by line reexamination of the list of condition/treat-
ment pairs. Using professional judgment, an interpretation of community values, cost ben-
efit ratios, and costs to altering the order of the pairs, the HSC manually adjusted the list.
Id. Using a "reasonableness" test, Commissioners re-ranked "out-of-position" items on
the draft list. HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 28.
86. Garland, supra note 57, at 68.
87. Id.
88. Id. Based on actuarial analysis, the legislature funded the program through line
587 of the prioritized list of condition/treatment pairs for the first year. OTA SUMMARY,
supra note 40, at 4. All diagnostic visits and evaluations would be covered under the plan.
Richard C. Wopat, The Oregon Health Plan: To Cover All Diagnostic Visits, 268 JAMA
790 (1992). "For the vast number of conditions below line 587, there is either no effective
treatment, or the treatment only expedites recovery and recovery would occur either with
or without treatment." Id.
89. Garland, supra note 57, at 69. Waiver of certain statutory and regulatory require-
ments in the federal Medicaid program was necessary for the implementation of S. 27.
HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 39. These waivers would allow Oregon to operate a dem-
onstration program that varies from the traditional Medicaid program. Id. Oregon's appli-
cation for the federal waiver was denied by the Health Care Financing Administration
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entailed actual implementation of the new services in the community.'
There are three common misconceptions about the Oregon plan.91
First, the plan is not concerned only with Medicaid. 2 Rather, the plan is
part of a trio of bills, designed to address the problem of the state's unin-
sured.9" Second, the plan is not proposed as a final solution.94 Instead, it
is envisioned as a stop gap remedy to bring short term relief to the unin-
sured while moving in a direction to make a national solution more
likely.9" Third, rather than an extension of the 1987 "no transplant" pol-
icy, the plan represents reform of the policy on which that decision was
based.96 This reform encourages funding choices based on a comprehen-
sive review of the entire range of services, rather than tradeoffs on op-
tional services.'
II. THE DENIAL OF THE FEDERAL WAIVER
A. The Office of Technology Assessment Review
1. Overview
In response to a request by United States Representatives John Dingell
and Henry Waxman, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) con-
ducted a study to analyze the Oregon Medicaid proposal and to discuss
potential implications for the federal government, the state of Oregon,
and Medicaid beneficiaries.98 The request was prompted by concerns
about the effects of the proposal on program recipients, and its potential
ramifications on the national health care debate.99 Among other topics,
(HCFA) on August 3, 1992. See Sullivan Letter, supra note 13 and discussion infra part
II.B. The HCFA manages the Medicaid program. Kitzhaber, supra note 27, at 64. HCFA
has the authority to grant an administrative waiver of the Medicaid regulations so that
Oregon can redesign the current package of Medicaid benefits. Id.
90. Garland, supra note 57, at 69.




95. Id. at 67-68; see also Kitzhaber Presentation, supra note 11, at 14.
96. Garland, supra note 57, at 68.
97. Id. "The object of the plan is to create a public policy tool for determining, for
purposes of collective funding, the worth of all forms of health service, not just life-saving
interventions, or high technology services, or high cost services." Id.
98. OTA SUMMARY, supra note 40, at 3-4. John Dingell is Chairman of the House
Commitee on Energy and Commerce, and Henry Waxman is Chairman of the House Sub-
committee on Health and the Environment. Id. at 3.
99. Id.
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OTA analyzed potential violations of constitutional and statutory law.10°
In its analysis, OTA noted that "[f]ederal statutes prohibiting recipients
of [flederal funds from discrimination on the basis of race, handicap, or
age clearly apply to the Oregon proposal." '' Additionally, federal im-
plementing regulations make further prohibitions on certain kinds of
"disparate-impact" discrimination."° While noting that the effects of the
anti-discrimination statutes are "not entirely clear cut," OTA concluded
that "the proposal is probably not very vulnerable to a challenge on the
basis of these [anti-discrimination] statutes unless in its implementation
the denial of benefits falls disproportionately on protected groups."' 3
OTA further concluded that a disparate impact on protected groups is
unlikely to occur at the proposed level of funding."
2. Americans with Disabilities Act Analysis
Because the waiver denial was based in large part on perceived viola-
tions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 0 5 it is important to
100. See OFFCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE U.S., EVALUATION
OF THE OREGON MEDICAID PROPOSAL, Ch. 7, 175-89 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
The study analyzed federal and state constitutional issues. Id. at 175-80. In terms of fed-
eral statutory issues, the study looked at "anti-dumping" and other federal laws that relate
to health care access, and the protection of human research subjects. Id. at 180-83. The
study also examined five federal civil rights statutes: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Act, and the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975. Id. at 183-88.
101. Id. at 188. The federal statutes referred to here are the federal civil rights statutes
listed supra note 100.
102. Id. at 188.
103. OTA SUMMARY, supra note 40, at 16. Such a disparate impact might be shown by
a demonstration that the services that the protected group uses tend to fall below the cutoff
point on the list. Id.
104. Id. OTA also notes that if the cutoff line were to move upward due to budgetary
shortfalls, the potential for such a disparate impact challenge would increase. Id.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (West Supp. 1991). The ADA is the culmination of more
than two decades of legislative activity designed to safeguard the civil rights of persons
with disabilities. David C. Hadorn, The Problem of Discrimination in Health Care Priority
Setting, 268 JAMA 1454 (1992). In broad terms, the ADA "prohibits discrimination
against otherwise qualified persons with disabilities in employment, public services and
transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications." ISSUE BRIEF, supra
note 78, at 5. The precursor legislation to the ADA was Title V of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. Id. at 5-6.
The ADA establishes a national mandate and enforceable standards for the elimination
of discrimination against persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2). The legis-
lation is intended to ensure that the federal government plays a key role in this effort, and
invokes the full sweep of congressional authority in addressing such discrimination.
§ 12101 (b)(3)-(4).
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examine OTA's assessment of that statute in greater detail."° OTA re-
viewed the ADA along with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, the model legislation for the ADA.10 7 The language of the regula-
Title II, concerning public services, would be the relevant section for challenging the
Oregon Health Plan for discrimination on the basis of disability. IssuE BRIEF, supra note
78, at 6. Title II states, in relevant part, that "no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. OTA notes that although the focus of the law is on
access of persons with disabilities to transportation, employment, and places of business,
this section of the Act can be construed to place a broader interpretation on its reach.
OTA REPORT, supra note 100, at 186.
Disability is defined under the statute as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2). Implementing regulations reiterate this broad definition, stating that disabili-
ties are considered to include "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine; [or] any mental or psychological disorder." Hadorn, supra, at 1454-55 (citing
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (U.S. Dept. of Justice regulations for state and local government serv-
ices, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,717 (1992))). An exhaustive list of disabilities does not exist, but
legislative reports and implementing regulations have identified at least the following:
"such contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech,
and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis,
cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disa-
bilities, HIV... disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), drug addiction, and alco-
holism." Id. at 1455. Persons are considered disabled under the ADA if one or more
major life activities are impaired by any of the conditions or illnesses listed. Id.
"Qualified individual with a disability" means "an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable modifications ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public en-
tity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Hadorn notes that although the phrase "otherwise qualified"
was dropped, the Supreme Court interpretation of this phrase under section 504 is instruc-
tive on the meaning of "qualified individual with a disability." Hadorn, supra, at 1457.
Section 504's language
meant that a person must be qualified in spite of, rather than apart from, his or
her disability. Therefore, it was ruled permissible to withhold benefits if a per-
son's disability-causing condition rendered him or her unfit or unqualified for re-
ceiving a benefit, providing that reasonable accomodation could not be made for
that disability.
Id.
It is also important to note that the preamble to the implementing regulations of Title II,
the Department of Justice stated that "[t]he standards of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act
apply for purposes of the ADA to the extent that the ADA has not explicitly adopted a
different standard than Title V." IssuE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 6.
106. For a discussion of the reasoning behind the waiver denial, see infra part II.B.
107. See OTA REPORT, supra note 100, at 185.
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tions interpreting the scope of section 504 indicates that intentional or
overt discrimination, as well as acts or practices that have a disparate im-
pact on the handicapped, are prohibited.' The Supreme Court defined
the scope of section 504 in Alexander v. Choate."°
OTA indicates that while a state may limit or restrict Medicaid covered
services in a facially neutral manner, even if it disadvantages groups who
qualify as handicapped under section 504, a state may be in violation of
section 504 if it explicitly defines or categorizes services such that non-
handicapped persons qualify for and receive medical treatment, but
handicapped persons are denied comparable services." 0 Even if this situ-
ation were not regarded as a per se violation, "it may be regarded as the
kind of disparate impact discrimination described in Choate.""' In such
a case, a court would have to apply the Choate balancing test.
112 OTA
concluded that "[i]t is simply not possible under current law to anticipate
how future courts would answer these questions."
11
3
Likewise, in the specific context of the ADA, OTA concluded that
"[a]ny assumption regarding how Oregon's proposal would fare under a
Disabilities Act challenge is necessarily speculative, since there is no case
law." 114 OTA concluded that the legislation places "no additional burden
on the discretion of a State Medicaid program beyond those already in
place" under section 504."1 However, OTA recognized that at least one
legal advocate suggested that there are additional requirements for Medi-
caid programs under the ADA." 6 Specifically, "the use of the public sur-
vey to assign values to health states gives inadequate weight to the
opinions of persons with disabilities and therefore biases the ranking pro-
108. Id.
109. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). The Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee Medicaid limit on
the length of a hospital stay "because it did not overtly distinguish between handicapped
and nonhandicapped beneficiaries" and "both categories have 'meaningful' access to the
same benefits." OTA REPORT, supra note 100, at 185.
110. OTA REPORT, supra note 100, at 185. Such categorization would amount to dif-
ferential treatment of similarly situated individuals, and would be considered intentional
discrimination under the statute. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. Under Choate, "concerns of 'disparate impact'. . . must be balanced by 'the
need to keep section 504 within manageable bounds' and avoid unduly burdensome 'Hand-
icapped Impact Statements."' Id. (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985)).
Determinative issues would include reasonable justifications, and the level of judicial re-
view required under the balancing test. Id.
113. Id.
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cess against services for disabled persons."' 17 Under this argument, the
additional burden for Oregon presumably would be to rid the prioritiza-
tion process of any impermissible bias.118 It is unclear how much weight
OTA gave to this argument in its analysis. 119
B. Decision of the Department of Health and Human Services
On August 3, 1992, Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS), wrote a letter denying Oregon's application for a waiver
of federal Medicaid laws. 12 0 In the letter, Sullivan expressed the Bush
Administration's commitment to encouraging innovation in state health
care programs and its favorable view of using states as "laboratories for
democracy." 12' Sullivan denied final approval of the application, how-
ever, pending resolution of legal issues relating primarily to the ADA. 22
Sullivan stressed that because of the "real possibility" that Oregon's ap-
117. Id.; see also Letter from Thomas J. Marzen, General Counsel, and Daniel Avila,
Staff Counsel, National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent & Disabled, to the
Honorable Christopher H. Smith, United States Representative 1 (Dec. 5, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Marzen & Avila Letter] (on file with the Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Pol-
icy). The OTA report cites this letter as providing the basis of this argument. OTA
REPORT, supra note 100, at 186. Ultimately, this is the argument used to deny Oregon's
waiver application. For a discussion of denial of Oregon's waiver application, see infra part
II.B.
118. Note, however, Oregon's observation to the contrary:
To the extent that courts have found non-employment related violations of the
Rehabilitation Act by state and local governments, these cases involved circum-
stances where individuals were found to have been deliberately excluded or segre-
gated by reason of their disability or handicap. In contrast, no case has held that a
state or local government violated the Rehabilitation Act based on a defective or
discriminatory decision-making process.
ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 6 n.1 (emphasis added).
119. OTA concluded that potential ADA challenges were "necessarily speculative."
OTA REPORT, supra note 100, at 186. Additionally:
OTA analysis of the list showed that the weights from the public survey had rela-
tively little effect on the final rankings on the list .... Furthermore, where survey
responses differed according to the health experiences of the respondent, the re-
sult in at least a few cases could be to increase the relative weight assigned to a
given treatment that would reduce the disability. However, because the Oregon
Health Services Commission has not made its ranking process explicit and be-
cause it is possible that in future revisions of the list public survey information
could be more determinate, the Oregon plan might still be vulnerable to chal-
lenge under the act.
Id. OTA thus seems to conclude that the argument should not impede implementation of
the project, but also leaves the door open for future claims on these grounds.
120. Sullivan Letter, supra note 13.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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proach would serve as a model for other states, "it is critically important
that [the OBHSA] go forward only with strict adherence to the legal pro-
tections" of the ADA. 123
In an attachment to Sullivan's letter, the reasoning behind the decision
was set forth. 24 It was noted that the record of the process by which the
prioritization list was compiled contained "considerable evidence that it
was based in substantial part" on a premise inconsistent with the ADA."2
The inconsistent premise was that "the value of the life of a person with a
disability is less than the value of the life of a person without a disabil-
ity.' 26 Further, there would be no approval of the waiver until HHS and
the Health Care Finance Administration were persuaded that the pro-
gram was revised to exclude such value of life considerations.
27
Following this general overview was a series of five suggestions and
observations to assist Oregon in its revision of the plan. First, the rank-
ings of the condition/treatment pairs should be redone without using data
derived from the telephone survey. 28 HHS determined that there were
"substantial indications" from the record that "the quality of life data
derived from the Oregon telephone survey quantifies stereotypic assump-
tions about persons with disabilities.' 29 Oregon did not dispute that the
123. Id.
124. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ANALYSIS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT ("ADA") OF THE OREGON REFORM DEMONSTRATION, Aug. 3, 1992




127. Id. The Health Care Finance Administration is the division of HHS which over-
sees the Medicaid program.
128. Id. at 2. The telephone survey at issue
was done to collect numeric values from the public which would represent their
feelings about impaired health states. The same symptoms and functional impair-
ment modifiers were used in the survey that the health services providers selected
to describe residual effects, death, and return to former state of health. Symp-
toms ranged from loss of consciousness due to seizure, fainting, or coma to wear-
ing eyeglasses or contact lenses. Functional impairments consisted of six
scenarios depicting mobility, physical activity and social activity. Survey respon-
dents, numbering 1,001, scored the severity of symptoms and functional impair-
ments on a scale of 0 (death) to 100 (perfect health). The lower the score, the
more serious the problem. Weights for each of the symptoms and functional
modifiers were computed for use in the benefits portion of the cost-benefit ratio.
HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 26; see also HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at App. C.
129. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 1; Three sources are cited for support of this
proposition: scholarly research concluding that "persons without disabilities systematically
undervalue the quality of life of those with disabilities" in quality of life surveys; the OTA
"found this bias against persons with disabilities in the Oregon survey results;" and the
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survey allowed bias to be taken into account, or that the survey affected
the final ranking. 130 Instead, Oregon argued that the impact of the sur-
vey on the final ranking of health services was "real but limited.' 131 In
contrast, HHS characterized the impact as "appreciable."' 32 Thus the
analysis concluded that "[u]nless Oregon funds all of the health services
on its prioritized list every year, it is unlikely ... that the Commission
could demonstrate that the telephone survey data will have no effect on
which medical conditions are treated."'
33
Second, Sullivan observed that other aspects of the ranking process re-
flected discrimination on the basis of disability.33 Therefore, the rank-
ings should be redone without taking certain community values into
account.' 35 The ranking of health service categories by the commission-
ers and the hand adjustments to the prioritized list were seen as problem-
atic by HHS.136 "[Q]uality of life" and "ability to function" were the two
community values used impermissibly. 137 These two values placed impor-
tance on "'restored health' and functional 'independence' and thus ex-
pressly value[d] a person without a disability more highly than a person
with a disability in the allocation of medical treatment.' 38 The analysis
HSC stated that "those who had experienced the problem [impaired health state] did not
feel it was as severe as those who had not experienced the problem." Id.
130. Id. i
131. Id. More precisely, Oregon argued that "statistical analysis demonstrates that the
survey has virtually no effect on the ultimate rankings of condition/treatment pairs." IssuE
BRIEF, supra note 78, at 7. Oregon characterized the impact as "negligible," and empha-
sized that the data was used "only as a general barometer of the public's attitudes toward
certain morbidities." Id. at 4. Oregon noted that a re-ranking of the list, using alternative
morbidity scores in the calculations, produced a virtually identical prioritization list. Id.
This serves to "underscore the insignificance of the morbidity score in the HSC's overall
calculation of net benefits." Id.
132. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 1. The analysis based this characterization on
Oregon's own data indicating that "120 services would move at least 30 places . . .and
more than 50 services would move at least 50 places on the list if constant values of 0.5
were substituted for values generated by the survey." Id. at 1-2.




137. Id. at 2. After a series of 47 community meetings, the full list of values which were
arrived at by consensus included prevention, cost-effectiveness, equity, effectiveness in
treatment, benefits many, mental health and chemical dependency, personal choice, com-
munity compassion, impact on society, length of life, and personal responsibility. HSC
REPORT, supra note 39, at App. F.
138. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 2. Quality of life was discussed at all commu-
nity meetings. OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS, HEALTH CARE IN COMMON: REPORT OF
THE OREGON HEALTH DECISIONS COMMUNITY MEETINGS PROCESS 11 (1990), reprinted in
1994] Oregon Demonstration Project
noted that "any methodology that would intentionally ration health care
resources by associating quality of life considerations with disabilities
does not comport with the mandate of the ADA.'
1 39
A third observation was that under Alexander v. Choate,14 ° Oregon
may consider "any content neutral factor that does not take disability into
account or that does not have a particular exclusionary effect on persons
with disabilities.' 14 1 Factors which Sullivan suggested Oregon consider in
allocating medical resources included "the cost of medical procedures,
the length of hospital stays, prevention of death, and prevention of conta-
gious diseases."' 42
Fourth, Sullivan expressed concern with the rankings of two specific
condition/treatment pairs that fell below the funding cutoff line. 43 The
first was liver transplants for alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver.144 Sullivan
stated that there is no "medical underpinning" for a distinction between
transplants for alcoholic and non-alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver. 45 Thus,
the Medicaid coverage decision violated the ADA because it rested en-
tirely on the presence of alcoholism, which is considered a disability
under Title 11.146 "Decisions with respect to coverage of such treatment
could, however, be made based on an appropriate record., 47 For exam-
HSC REPORT, supra note 39, at App. F. [hereinafter OHD REPORT]. Services which en-
hance quality of life "are those which enhance a person's productivity and emotional well
being, restore an individual's health, reduce pain and suffering, and allow one to function
independently." Id. "A high quality of life was felt to be valuable because it increases
emotional well being, reduces pain and suffering, and increases productivity, indepen-
dence, and length of life." Id.
Ability to function was discussed at 75% of the community meetings. Id. at 14. Ability
to function "includes emotional well being, productivity (not necessarily economic), inde-
pendence, and restored quality of life." Id. Ability to function is valuable "because it
implies restoring a person to a preillness state (or as close as possible) and to indepen-
dence." Id.
139. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 2.
140. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
141. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 2; see also Choate, 469 U.S. at 302.
142. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 2. The permissible factors are not limited to
the four listed. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3. Liver transplants for alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver are ranked at line 690,
while such transplants for non-alcoholic cirrhosis are ranked at line 366. Id. at 2-3. A
"medical underpinning" that would substantiate the need for differential treatment would
be that a transplant is a more' successful treatment for one type of cirrhosis but not the
other. Id. at 3.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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pie, Oregon could adopt a Medicaid standard that requires "evidence of
sufficient social support to assure assistance in alcohol rehabilitation"
before the procedure is funded.'
The second condition/treatment pair involved treatment of extremely
low birth weight babies with gestation periods of less than 23 weeks.
149
The concern here was similar to the concern for transplants for alcoholic
cirrhosis of the liver: the possibility of differential treatment of similarly
situated individuals.' 5 ° Under the Oregon proposal, medical therapy was
available for low birth weight babies that exceeded 499 grams and appar-
ently for low birth weight babies less than 500 grams but with gestation
periods of more than 23 weeks. 5' Presuming that low birth weight with a
gestation period less than 23 weeks was a protected disability under the
ADA, Oregon's distinction in prioritization violated Title II.
Sullivan's fifth observation also involved low birth weight babies. The
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 "established standards relating to the
withholding of treatment for medically fragile infants."' 52 Those amend-
ments gave "substantial deference to the medical judgment of the treat-
ing physician" and presupposed the rendering of certain life support
services.53 Concluding that the low priority ranking of such medical
therapy amounts to a refusal to cover life support for medically fragile
infants, the ranking was found to be inconsistent with the provisions of
the Child Abuse Amendments. 54
III. RESPONSE AND COMMENT
A. Public Values and Political Accountability
In formulating the prioritization process, Oregon understood that the
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. Medical therapy for low birth weight babies who exceed 499 grams is ranked at
line 22. Id.
152. Id. In 1984, Congress amended the Child Abuse Prevention and Teatment and
Adoption legislation, giving HHS additional authority for regulating discrimination against
handicapped newborns. OTA REPORT, supra note 100, at 186. The amendments defined
"the withholding of medically indicated treatment and nutrition from handicapped infants
as a type of child abuse," and conditioned the receipt of federal funds on a state's enforce-
ment of its laws prohibiting such child abuse. Id. at 186-87. Exceptions to the withholding
of "medically indicated treatment" are permitted under the implementing regulations only
under narrowly defined circumstances. Id. at 187.
153. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 3. Such life support services include medica-
tion, nutrition and hydration. ld.
154. Id.; see OTA REPORT, supra note 100, at 187 (supporting this conclusion).
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composition of a basic benefit package "should result from an open, dem-
ocratically driven process in which public values and technical expertise
play complementary roles."' 55 Indeed, any health resource allocation de-
cision ought to involve public values and political accountability, as well
as technical choice.'56 Understanding that "[slomeone's values necessar-
ily play a role in defining basic benefits," and "[w]ho supplies those val-
ues is the question," Oregon allowed its citizens to play a definitive
role. 5 7 Instead of deferring to expert opinion and judgment, Oregon
sought to balance technical expertise with values from a "common good
perspective."' 518 Oregon envisioned the public's role as a means of ensur-
ing political accountability for explicit rationing in health resource
allocation. 59
The rationale underlying HHS's denial of the necessary waivers for full
implementation of the Oregon Demonstration Project strikes at the very
heart of Oregon's innovation. The key criticisms of Oregon's process for
developing the prioritized list are aimed at the public opinion surveys and
the community meetings. Yet these are precisely the innovations that al-
low for open debate, explicit decision-making, and political and social ac-
countability. HHS's mandates for changes in the prioritization process
would take decisions out of the hands of the people and place them back
in the hands of the few, the experts. These few are far removed from
accountability and, arguably, just as susceptible to inappropriate bias.
This reallocation of decision-making effectively leaves Oregon where it
began: without any real accountability for the health resource allocation
decisions that must be made.
B. Rebuttal of Waiver Denial
160
1. HHS's First Mandate
HHS's first mandate requires that the prioritization process be redone
without taking into account data derived from the phone survey. Accord-
ing to HHS, three sources of information demonstrate that the quality of
life information gleaned from the surveys quantify stereotypic assump-
tions about persons with disabilities.' 6 ' However, none of these sources




159. See discussion supra part I.C.1.
160. For a full discussion of the reasons behind the HHS denial, see supra part II.B.
161. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 1.
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support HHS's conclusion.
The first source relied upon is a body of scholarly research indicating
that "persons without disabilities systematically undervalue the quality of
life of those with disabilities."162 As an example of such scholarly work,
HHS specifically cited an article in the Hastings Center Report by David
C. Hadorn. 163 However, this same author more recently concluded that
"[t]here is no evidence that ratings for health states (e.g., a specified state
of pain or of limited activity) differ with ability level.' 1 64 Furthermore,
Hadorn concluded' that "there is little evidence that the ratings obtained
from the Oregon poll differ systematically from the ratings that would
have been obtained from disabled people.' 165 Hadorn found that Ore-
gon's data on respondents' health and ability levels reveal no substantial
differences in values based on these levels. 166 He thus concluded that "a
disabled person's assessment of his or her own personal quality of life,
while often higher than might be expected, cannot necessarily serve to
indicate how that person would rate different levels of disability in the
abstract.' 67 Moreover, it is likely that even disabled persons prefer
nondisabled states, and that they would rate nondisabled states higher
than disabled states. 68
The OTA report is the second source relied on by HHS. HHS argued
that OTA found a bias against persons with disabilities in the Oregon
survey results.169 Yet this same report states that:
[i]ronically, OTA analyses of the list showed that the weights
from the public survey had relatively little effect on the final
rankings on the list .... Furthermore, where survey responses
differed according to the health experiences of the respondent,
the result in at least a few cases could be to increase the relative
weight assigned to a given treatment that would reduce the
disability.
170
Relying in part on this passage from the OTA Report, Oregon argued in
its issue brief to HHS that the use of the results of the telephone survey
162. Id.
163. See David C. Hadorn, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality of Life and
Public Policy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, 11, 11 (citing other studies).





169. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 1.
170. OTA REPORT, supra note 100, at 186.
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as one of several factors in the prioritization process did not bias the final
list.17 1 In addition to statistical analysis demonstrating that the survey
had virtually no effect on the final rankings, there is no evidence to sug-
gest that the survey was flawed or biased. 72
The Oregon Health Services Commission Report is the third source
cited by HHS. The HSC Report indicates that "those who had exper-
ienced the problem [impaired health state] did not feel it was as severe as
those who had not experienced the problem."' 73 This conclusion, how-
ever, is limited to five specific health states: (1) difficulty in learning,
remembering or thinking clearly; (2) coughing, wheezing, or difficulty
breathing; (3) taking prescribed medication or following a diet for health
reasons; (4) wearing glasses or contact lenses; and (5) difficulty in sexual
performance. 74 The HSC conclusion therefore only applies to these five
health conditions.
HHS attempted to cite the HSC Report out of context and to create
the impression that Oregon's own report indicates discriminatory and im-
permissible bias in the telephone survey results. This is not a proper con-
clusion to be drawn from the material cited by HHS.175 Furthermore,
reliance on the OTA Report and scholarly research to support the propo-
sition that the survey results were biased is misplaced. While such evi-
dence may very well exist, HHS failed to employ its use in the denial of
the federal waiver.
One should also observe that the impact of the telephone surveys on
the final prioritized list is really a matter of characterization. Oregon
called the impact "real but limited," and "negligible.' 17 6 Oregon based
these characterizations on its comparison of the prioritized list with a rer-
anked list that substituted constant values for the survey results. 77 But
HHS called the impact "appreciable," based on its assessment of the same
178Suhdscomparison. Such disparity in interpretation leaves the validity of
171. IssuE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 7 (emphasis added).
172. Id.
173. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 1 (citing HSC REPORT, supra note 42, at app.
C-11).
174. HSC REPORT, supra note 42, at app. C-11.
175. See discussion supra at note 131 (indicating that the survey's impact on the final
rankings was negligible at best).
176. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 81, at 4, 7.
177. Id.
178. For a full discussion of the community meeting process, see supra notes 85, 137 and
138, and accompanying text.
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either standard and the actual significance of the survey in the prioritiza-
tion process in question.
2. HHS's Second Mandate
HHS's second mandate required that the prioritized list be redone
without taking into consideration the community values of "quality of
life" and "ability to function." These two values were among the four-
teen values identified by Oregonians as important in making health re-
source allocations, based on a series of forty-seven community meetings
held throughout the state.179 HHS criticized the role these two values
played in the ranking of categories and hand adjustments to the priori-
tized list.
Disallowing the use of these two values in the prioritization process
further undermined Oregon's goal of achieving real accountability in its
health resource allocation decisionmaking. It is important to note that
HHS did not object to the actual process used to rank the condition/treat-
ment categories and the making of hand adjustments to the list. HHS
also did not object to HSC's role as the entity to carry out this part of the
process. The objection was limited solely to the roles that the values of
"quality of life" and "ability to function" played.
Arguably, values play a role in assessing quality of life whenever medi-
cal treatment decisions are made. HHS simply shifted whose values play
that role from-the community to the Commission members. Rather than
community values, derived from consensus and thus more likely to reflect
some degree of objectivity, serving as general'guiding principles for the
Commission, the Commission members are confined to their own percep-
tions and perspectives. The subjective judgments of these few members
effectively undermines Oregon's effort to create a decision-making pro-
cess that holds all Oregonians accountable for health resource allocation.
Furthermore, several factors keep the potential negative effects of
"quality of life" and "ability to function" in check. Twelve other values
were identified in the community meetings, including the values of eq-
uity, effectiveness, and community compassion.180 These values reflect
179. For a full discussion of the community meeting process, see supra notes 88, 140 and
141 and accompanying text.
180. The concept of equity
stem[s] from a basic premise that no person should be excluded from receiving
health care when they need it. This was often voiced as feeling that government
should take more responsibility in the health care arena to work towards the as-
surance that everyone has equal access to an adequate level of health care. Eq-
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community insistence that health care must be available to all, that com-
passion must be shown to those with debilitating conditions, and that ef-
fectiveness must be measured by improvement in quality of life as well as
by cure. Coupled with the general goal of promoting health in terms of
maintaining, restoring, or improving health,"'1 these values check poten-
tial abuses of "quality of life" and "ability to function" considerations.
Recognition by Oregon citizens of the potential hazards of making
quality of life assessments is another factor that limits the potential nega-
tive effect of considering the the values of "quality of life" and "ability to
function." Oregon Health Decisions (OHD), a community organization
that conducted the community meetings for OHS, noted that citizens had
difficulty articulating objective criteria for measuring quality of life.'8 2
OHD also noted citizen concern "about who had the right to make deci-
sions regarding one's quality of life."' 83 HSC knew of these concerns as it
ranked the categories and made line by line adjustments. Thus, HSC was
aware that its decision-making authority could be abused. Arguably, this
served as a second check on the negative consequences of including qual-
ity of life and ability to function in this part of the process.
3. HHS's Third Mandate
The third mandate required that the factors considered when prioritizing
health care services be content neutral, not take disability into account,
and not have a particular exclusionary effect on disabled persons.I8 4 Ac-
cordingly, HHS would have the ranking process devoid of any reference
to quality of life and limited to a set of "neutral" criteria.
Regarding content neutrality, Oregon may consider factors such as cost
of medical procedures, length of hospital stays, prevention of death, and
prevention of contagious diseases.'8 5 HHS also suggested that methodol-
uity was felt to be valuable because it encompasses justice and humaneness in
health care ....
OHD REPORT, supra note 138, at 15. Effective treatment includes "an indication of suc-
cess rate which incorporates a cure rate, improvement in quality of life, and length of suc-
cess, with priority going to long term success over short term success." Id. at 17.
Community compassion includes "a community concern for life, preserving the integrity of
an individual and a family, and compassion for the vulnerable such as children and the
elderly. Community compassion was felt to be valuable because it encourages humaneness
in caring, and a sense of community support." Id. at 21.
181. See supra part I.C.1 for the relevant policy discussion.
182. See OHD REPORT, supra note 138, at 11.
183. Id.
184. See HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 2.
185. Id.
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ogies that intentionally ration health care resources by associating quality
of life considerations with disabilities will not conform to the mandates of
the ADA.186 Oregon, however, associated quality of life considerations
with all health states, not just disabilities. There is no disparate treatment
of similarly situated individuals because all persons are treated the same.
Furthermore, by disallowing quality of life as a consideration in the pri-
oritization process, HHS actually hinders some treatments utilized by the
disabled from receiving higher rankings.'8 7 "Failing to differentially
value states of disability vs. nondisability would result in a policy that
failed to value ability-restoring treatments.'
188
Regarding the requirement that factors not take disability into account,
HHS has essentially proposed a new standard for measuring exclusion of
a qualified individual "by reason of such disability."' 89 The standard set
forth in Alexander v. Choate for determining when disability has been
taken into account requires that the disabled not be denied access to or
excluded from the Medicaid services that a state has chosen to provide
for all Medicaid recipients on the basis of their present disability. 9 ° HHS
implied that the Oregon plan discriminates based on an individual's fu-
186. Id.
187. See IssuE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 7 (quoting OTA REPORT, supra note 100, for
the proposition that "[w]here survey responses differed according to the health experience
of the respondent, the result in a[t] least a few cases could be to increase the relative
weight assigned to a given treatment that would reduce the disability").
188. Hadorn, supra note 105, at 1455.
The actual use of differential preference judgments for quality-of-life states (in-
cluding functional status) lies in the consequent ability of the prioritization pro-
cess to identify - and ensure coverage for - services that restore function (or
prevent the loss of function) . . . . These treatments would not be valued very
highly if disabled persons' post hoc preferences were used as the standard of valu-
ation, since (according to the Center report, at least) disabled people consider
states of limited functioning to be virtually as desirable as states of full function
.... If limited function isn't so bad after all, in other words, services that improve
function will not be considered particularly worthwhile.
Id. at 1456.
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (West Supp. 1991).
190. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 8. In Choate, the Supreme Court noted:
The new limitation does not invoke criteria that have a particular exclusionary
effect on the handicapped; the reduction, neutral on its face, does not distinguish
between those whose coverage will be reduced and those whose coverage will not
on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait that the handicapped as a class are less
capable of meeting or less likely of having .... The reduction in inpatient cover-
age will leave both handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users with identi-
cal and effective hospital services fully available for their use, with both classes of
users subject to the same durational limitation.
Id. (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985)).
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ture disabled state.191 No regulations have been promulgated to support
this expanded interpretation articulated by HHS. Furthermore, under
the Oregon plan, a person's present disability has no impact on whether a
particular health care service is covered by the plan, or on whether an
otherwise qualified individual is eligible for a particular medical treat-
ment. 192 Oregon thus meets the standard set forth in Alexander v.
Choate, and does not unlawfully take disability into account.
The presence of bias in the prioritization process is debatable. Some
argue that no service was left unfunded because of bias against the dis-
abled.1 93 The next section will demonstrate that these concerns can be
addressed without dismantling the entire Oregon project.
191. For example, picture the following scenario:
Patient A and Patient B are both injured in an accident. Treatment A is recom-
mended for Patient A, while Treatment B is recommended for Patient B. Both
treatments cost the same. However, Treatment A will sustain Patient A's life but
will not restore the abilities A lost after the accident (such as an ability to walk),
while Treatment B will sustain B's life and restore his ability to walk. If the basis
for funding B but not A is a quality-of-life judgment that being able to walk is of
greater benefit than not being able to walk, for example, then a decision to deny
treatment for A would be discrimination based on A's resulting level of disability.
In effect, B's life would be considered more valuable than A's life because B will
regain an additional function while A would not. Under the second scenario, a
distinction between two effective treatments would be based not on treatment
effectiveness, because both treatments would sustain life, but on an inappropriate
assessment of the underlying quality-of-life each patient will have after treat-
ment. This scenario describes the Oregon Plan.
Marzen & Avila Letter, supra note 117, at 6 (emphasis added).
192. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 7. Thus, under the Oregon plan,
the amputee who requires treatment for a ruptured spleen will be treated exactly
the same as an individual without such a disability. The deaf individual who has
an upper respiratory infection and common cold will likewise be treated the same
under the OHP as an individual who can hear. In sum, whether or not a partici-
pant in the OHP has a disability has no bearing on whether a particular condition
is covered. All OHP participants are subject to the same benefits and limitations
imposed by the OHP, regardless of whether or not they are disabled.
Id. Further, "[tlhe 587 funded condition/treatment pairs will be available uniformly to all
participants with or without disabilities." Id. at 8. "The existence or non-existence of a
disability simply is not a factor in determining whether a participant is covered for a partic-
ular health service; what is determinative is whether the health service is one that the
Oregon legislature has determined to fund." Id. at 9.
193. See Virginia Wilson, Woe the Reformers, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1992, at 55. "If even
a hint of such a judgment infects a health-insurance plan, its provisions may now be fatally
flawed. That's chiefly what nailed the Oregon proposal, although [Michael] Astrue [gen-
eral counsel at HHS] can't name any service left unfunded because of bias against the
disabled." Id.
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4. HHS's Fourth Mandate
HHS's fourth mandate is specific to the placement of two condition-
treatment pairs: liver transplants for alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver and
life support for extremely low birth weight babies under twenty-three
weeks gestation. 9 4 HHS's concern is that the ADA is violated because
individuals with these disabilities will not receive treatment, while simi-
larly situated individuals without these two conditions will be treated. 95
. The ranking of low birth weight babies under twenty-three weeks ges-
tation is easily resolved without rejecting or dismantling the entire priori-
tization process. HSC is required to update the prioritized list every two
years.' 9 6 Additionally, the Commission is authorized to adjust the list in
the interim to make technical changes due to errors, omissions, advances
in medical technology, or new data regarding health outcomes. 1 97 This
authority means that "[t]o the extent an advocacy group can point to the
ranking of a specific condition/treatment pair as somehow discriminating
against the disabled, the group [can] request that the condition/treatment
pair be specifically evaluated by the HSC."'19 This approach allows the
Commission to revise and modify the Demonstration Project to accomo-
date particular concerns when reasonable, without invalidating the entire
plan.
19 9
5. HHS's Fifth Mandate
In its fifth mandate, HHS responded to concerns over potential viola-
tions of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, which established stan-
dards relating to the withholding of treatment for medically fragile
infants.2" Presumably, this mandate could be addressed in the same
manner as the fourth mandate. Therefore, instead of dismantling the en-
tire prioritization process, this particular legal concern could be ad-
dressed through the HSC authority to adjust the prioritized list.
194. HHS ANALYSIS, supra note 124, at 2.
195. See Commission Minutes, supra note 15, at 3.
196. IssuE BRIEF, supra note 78, at 5.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 9.
199. Id.
200. See supra note 152 for a discussion of these amendments.
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C. Further Comments and Considerations
1. Impact on State Reform
In recent years, increased activity has occurred at the state level with re-
gard to health care reform. With the severity of the health care crisis
increasing and the absence of federal action, states are taking the lead in
health care reform.2°' While some argue that the state level is the appro-
priate level for change, others believe that the only way to make signifi-
cant progress is through reform at the national level.2' All recognize,
however, that states play a critical role in health care reform.
Many leaders look to the Oregon Demonstration Project as a model
that might be duplicated in other states.20 3 However, the denial of the
federal waivers and the reasoning behind HHS's decision have created
heightened tension among many state reformers. Alicia Pelrine, Director
for Human Resources for the National Governor's Association, stated
that "it has certainly created a sense of nervousness among the other
states about whether the administration is really interested in allowing
the states to move forward on comprehensive reform efforts. '"204 Like-
wise, there has been concern that the ultimate message "is that if you use
the democratic process and you thrash this out among the citizens of the
state, you run the risk of getting a negative answer. Whereas if you ... do
it in secret . . . you may have a better shot at getting your waiver
approved. ,
2 5
While the final impact on state reform efforts is unclear, HHS's denial
of the federal waivers may have a chilling effect on a state's willingness to
engage in innovative projects, which may ultimately endanger efforts at
the national level. States are often looked to as "laboratories" for engag-
ing in social experimentation. Without state activity, national reform will
lack an important resource for creativity and innovation in solving health
201. Freedman, supra note 9, at 36-37. "Virtually every state either has taken action on
the problem or is considering legislation." Id. at 37; see also Greenberg, supra note 9, at
1101 (describing reform efforts in Minnesota, Florida, Hawaii, and Oregon).
202. Compare McDonough, supra note 9, at 61 (arguing that "[s]tates occupy a critical
role in the debate about health care"), with Deborah Stone, Why the States Can't Solve the
Health Care Crisis, AM. PROsPEcr, Spring 1992, at 51 (arguing that "states cannot do it
alone, however, because of fundamental impediments in the federal system").
203. See, e.g., Sullivan Letter, supra note 13.
204. Interview: A View from the National Governor's Association, Health Line, Ameri-
can Political Network, Inc., Aug. 7, 1992 [hereinafter Peirine Interview](on file with the
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy).
205. Id.
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care problems, as well as a forum to test new ideas before national
implementation.
2. The Oregon Plan as One Step Forward
It is important to remember that Oregon does not intend the Demon-
stration Project to serve as a final solution for the state's health care cri-
sis. Rather, it is intended as a temporary means of combatting the twin
problems of accessibility and affordability in a limited context. Efforts to
find a national solution must continue. Many of the criticisms of the Ore-
gon Demonstration Project have been directed at Oregon's failure to cre-
ate an ideal solution.2 °6 However, the Oregon Demonstration Project
must be evaluated as "an improvement over the status quo., 20 7 Thus,
although the Oregon plan may fall short of the ideal in many regards, its
efforts ought to be encouraged.
3. A Guaranteed Minimum Benefits Package
A major criticism of the Oregon Demonstration Project is that because
the cutoff line for coverage is based on financial considerations, the level
of coverage can rise and fall with budgetary pressures.20 Arguably, Ore-
gon's approach is just as arbitrary as the current means of dealing with
budgetary shortfalls.2° One solution is to require Oregon to increase the
number of services funded,21 0 and to commit to a minimum level of cov-
erage for the entire period of the demonstration project. 211 By going
somewhat further down the list in its commitment to funding, Oregon
206. See John A. Kitzhaber, Constructive Debate in a Real World, HMQ, First Quarter
1991, at 16.
207. Id. Kitzhaber states:
Will the Oregon plan resolve all inequities and inefficiencies and produce the
perfect system? Of course not. In an ideal system ... everyone would have ac-
cess to every medical service and procedure, and no one would have to pay. But
contrary to the intimations of our critics, we have never claimed that our proposal
represents the best system. We claim only that it represents a better one, that it is
both more equitable and more effective in promoting the general health of the
population, and that it adheres to a clearly defined policy, which we are prepared
to defend ....
Id. at 17.
208. Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, The Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project -
Will It Provide Adequate Medical Care?, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 340, 343 (1992).
209. Id. Such current methods include "further restricting Medicaid eligibility criteria,
underfunding services, or setting artificially low rates of reimbursement to providers." Id.
210. Id.; see also Joshua M. Wiener, Oregon's Plan for Health Care Rationing, BROOK-
INGS REV., Winter 1992, at 26, 31.
211. Wiener, supra note 210, at 31.
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might achieve an "adequate benefit package. 212 Such a package would
encompass most of the eight condition/treatment pairs classified as "es-
sential to basic care," and the fifty-one pairs the Commission assessed as
"very important," but which are not currently slated for funding.213 This
kind of approach is more acceptable than redrawing lines according to
politics and finances. 214 Even more importantly, "[i]f Oregon lengthens
the list and guarantees maintenance of that level of coverage, it might be




Under current case law and regulations promulgated pursuant to sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 and the Americans With Disa-
bilities Act, there is no legal precedent for invalidating as discriminatory
a decision-making process in a non-employment related context. The Or-
egon Demonstration Project is neutral on its face, and does not impremis-
sibly "take disability into account," as the Supreme Court currently
interprets this phrase. Furthermore, the Oregon Demonstration Project
already has procedures to correct any instances of discrimination that
might occur and to accommodate specific concerns as to exclusionary ef-
fects. Therefore, dismantling the entire prioritization process is unneces-
sary. Without supporting case law or implementing regulations, the
Department of Health and Human Services proposed a new standard for
finding disability-based discrimination when it denied the necessary waiv-
ers to implement the Oregon Demonstration Project. Arguably, this is
beyond the scope of HHS's authority. Ironically, this misapplication of
the ADA could weaken its strength and effectiveness in protecting the
rights of the disabled.
While not perfect, the Oregon Demonstration Project is a step forward
from the status quo. The true innovation of the Oregon plan is its ability
to achieve accountability in the health resource allocation decision-mak-
ing process. The specific mandates of HHS and the reasoning behind
them have undermined efforts to attain this goal, and stalled one of the




214. Steinbrook & Lo, supra note 208, at 343.
215. Wiener, supra note 210, at 31.
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